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The need for an explicit and exact definition of a planet has arise out of the growing rate of 
discovery  of  Trans-Neptunian  Objects  (TNOs)  with  physical  and  orbital  properties 
comparable with those of Pluto, the smallest planet of the solar system. On July 29, 2005, 
the IAU Circular 8577 has announced the discovery of a TNO, named 2003UB313, bigger 
than Pluto; its discoverers have asserted that 2003UB313 must be regarded as the tenth 
planet  of  the  solar  system.  Lacking  of  a  definition  of  a  planet,  the  International 
Astronomical Union has been unable to decide whether 2003UB313 should be classified as 
a  planet,  and no official  name has  been given to  2003UB313.  Eventually,  astronomers 
gathered at the 26th General Assembly of International Astronomical Union agreed on a 
definition of a planet, and Pluto was demoted from the role of planet. This situation is very 
interesting for the philosopher of science who can be an eyewitness of a real process of 
explication of a scientific concept. In this  paper I examine various proposals for defining 
the  concept  of  a  planet  and  put  them  into  a  philosophical  context.  The  principal 
philosophical results is that  planet, as defined by the new official definition, is not a natural 
kind.
1. The need for a definition of a planet
The need for a definition of a planet has arisen out of the growing rate of discovery of Trans-
Neptunian Objects (TNOs) with physical and orbital properties comparable with those of Pluto, the 
smallest planet of the solar system. Some astronomers have proposed to consider a few number of 
TNOs  as  planets,  thus  increasing  the  number  of  planets  of  the  solar  system from nine  to  an 
unknown  number  probably  less  than  twenty-five  (Basri  [1999,  2003]).  Another  group  of 
astronomers  has  proposed  to  change  the  status  of  Pluto,  demoting  it  from  planet  to  the  first 
discovered TNO, thus decreasing the number of planets to eight (Brown [2004]). A third group has 
suggested for Pluto a dual status as a major and a minor body (Marsden [1999], A’Hearn [2001]). 
On  July  29,  2005,  the  IAU  Circular  8577  has  announced  the  discovery  of  a  TNO,  named 
2003UB313, larger than Pluto1; its discoverers have asserted that 2003UB313 must be regarded as a 
planet, the tenth planet of the solar system (Brown [2005]). Lacking of a definition of a planet, the 
IAU has been unable to decide whether 2003UB313 should be classified as a planet, and no official 
1 Its estimated size is about 3.000 km (Bertoldi et al. 2006); Pluto’s diameter is about 2.300 km.
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name has been given to 2003UB313. The discovery of 2003UB313 has precipitated the need for a 
definition of a planet. 
The International Astronomical Union (IAU)2 has established the Working Group Definition 
of a Planet under Division III - Planetary System Sciences in order to consider the definition of a 
minimum size for a Planet. The Working Group has completed the assigned task – without reaching 
general  consensus  –  and  has  sent  a  report  to  the  IAU  Executive  Committee.  Later  IAU  has 
established the Planet Definition Committee in order to “resolve the issue in a manner that had a 
solid scientific basis and which might achieve consensus” (Williams [2006]). Eventually the Planet 
Definition Committee has proposed a definition of planet with a draft resolution (IAU [2006a]) 
which has been voted in the IAU General Assembly in Prague, August 2006. The passed resolution 
(IAU [2006c]) was indeed different from the proposed one.
2. The discovery of asteroids and of Pluto
The ancient Greek astronomers identified seven celestial bodies that appear to move with respect to 
the fixed stars. They named them planets, from the Greek word πλανήτης, planetes, which means 
wanderer. The seven planets were the Sun, the Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. 
With the Copernican revolution the Earth substituted the Sun as a planet. The discovery of Jupiter’s 
Galilean moons produced a new category of celestial objects: the satellites of the planets. The Moon 
was reclassified and demoted from the role of planet. 
We are particularly interested in the history of the discovery of Ceres (and later of the other 
asteroids)  and  in  the  discovery  of  Pluto  (and  later  of  the  other  TNOs).  In  1766  the  German 
astronomer, physicist and biologist Johann Daniel Titius noted that the distance of the planets from 
the Sun, measured in Astronomical Units3 (AU),  can be approximately expressed by a suitable 
formula, later popularized by the German astronomer Johann Elert Bode; the formula is now known 
as  Titius-Bode’s  law.  The  discovery  of  Uranus  in  1781  (by  German-born  British  astronomer 
Wilhelm Friedrich Herschel), with the semi-major axis closes to the predicted value, gave a strong 
support to Titius-Bode’s law. The law predicted the existence of an unknown planet at about 2.8 AU 
from the Sun. In 1799 a group of twenty-four astronomers organized by Hungarian astronomer 
Franz Xaver von Zach decided to undertake a systematic search for a missing planet between Mars 
2 The  International  Astronomical  Union  (IAU)  was  founded  in  1919,  in  order  to  promote  astronomy  through 
international  cooperation.  The  IAU  is  the  internationally  recognized  authority  for  naming  celestial  bodies.  It  is 
organized (October 2005) in 12 scientific divisions, 37 commissions and about 90 working groups.
3 An Astronomical Unit is the length of the semi-major axis of the Earth’s orbit around the Sun (about 150 million 
kilometers).
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and Jupiter. On January 1, 1801, Italian astronomer Giuseppe Piazzi (who did not take part to the 
search)  discovered  by  accident  Ceres.  Its  distance  from  the  Sun  was  very  close  to  the  value 
predicted by Titius-Bode’s law, and thus Ceres was immediately regarded as the missing planet. In 
1802 the German physician and astronomer Heinrich Wilhelm Matthäus Olbers discovered another 
object,  Pallas,  at  2.8 AU from the Sun. In 1804 the German astronomer Karl  Ludwig Harding 
discovered a third object, Juno, at 2.7 AU. In 1807 Olbers discovered a fourth object, Vesta, at 2.4 
AU.  Olbers  proposed  a  theory  according  to  which  those  celestial  bodies  were  fragments  of  a 
disintegrated planet. Herschel, the discoverer of Uranus, coined the name asteroids to refer to them, 
from a Greek word meaning  star-like  (due to the small dimensions of asteroids, in the telescopic 
view they appear as points without a discernible disk, such as stars). Ceres, Pallas, Juno and Vesta 
were regarded as planets until the half of the nineteenth century4. The demotion from planets began 
with  the  discovery  of  other  objects  orbiting  between  Mars  and  Jupiter:  the  fifth  asteroid  was 
discovered in 1845, and by the end of 1851 fifteen asteroids were known. At this point there were 
three main reactions.  First,  the special  symbols  previously used for  referring to  asteroids  were 
abandoned and the asteroids were named by a number in the chronological order of discovery. 
Second, the asteroids were listed in ephemerides in a dedicated section separated from the planetary 
section. Third, the name ‘minor planets’ was coined. Finally, the estimated size for Ceres, Pallas and 
Juno, which was excessive, suddenly dropped to a too small value.5
What  is  the  philosophical  lesson  from this  story?  A supposed  natural  law  predicts  the 
existence of a planet at a distance of 2.8 AU from the Sun. An object is found at 2.8 AU from the 
Sun. This discovery is regarded as a confirmation of the law, and thus the object is regarded as the 
searched planet. When other objects are found at the same distance from the Sun, they are regarded 
as the remnants of a destroyed planet. When too many objects are found, a new class of celestial 
objects is created (asteroids), and the discovered objects are demoted from planets. We can view 
this story as a brilliant example of a self-correction procedure in science, operating according to a 
logical and rational scientific attitude: in a first moment, observations seemed to agree with an 
alleged scientific law; later observations proved that the agreement with the law was only apparent, 
and a new category of objects is created to account for the new discoveries.
The discovery of Pluto is, in the essential points, almost identical to Ceres’ discovery. Early 
in the twentieth century U.S. astronomers Lowell and Pickering, studying alleged perturbations of 
4 Ceres, Pallas, Juno and Vesta were listed as planets in introductory texts; in published ephemerides they were listed 
between Mars and Jupiter, in the section dedicated to planets; special symbols were invented for denoting them, as usual 
for the other planets.
5 As an example, the estimated size for Pallas was about 3.380 km in 1850, and only 270 in 1856; now its estimated size 
is about 500 km (see Hughes [1994]).
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Uranus’ orbit, predicted the existence of a Trans-Neptunian planet. U.S. astronomer Tombaugh, in 
1930, after a systematic search, found a new object, Pluto, at about six degree from the predicted 
position. Pluto was immediately recognized as the ninth planet of the solar system. However, its 
size, estimated from the apparent magnitude, was lesser than the predicted size; also its estimated 
mass was too small in order to account for Uranus’ perturbations. Only in 1978, with the discovery 
of Pluto’s moon Charon, it was possible to determine the mass of Pluto with great precision: Pluto’s 
mass was too small and not in agreement with predictions. It became evident that the discovery of 
Pluto, near the predicted position, was only an accident. Starting with 1990s many objects were 
discovered after Neptune’s orbit, and they were called Trans-Neptunian Objects (TNOs). Several 
objects have a mass comparable to that of Pluto, and an object (2003UB313) has an estimated mass 
greater than Pluto’s mass. Eventually a question about Pluto’s status as a planet was proposed.
3. Some proposals for defining a planet
The definition of a planet that the IAU is searching can be viewed as a test between different 
conceptions of science: the decision about Pluto’s status can be guided by logical principles or by 
historical considerations; astronomers can consider only empirical evidence or they can consider 
tradition. The problem facing astronomers is very interesting for the philosopher of science who has 
the opportunity  to  be an eyewitness  of  a  real  process  about  a  difficult  decision,  which can be 
motivated by empirical  evidence or by history and tradition.  Now I will  examine the principal 
definitions which have been proposed.
The first definition I examine is proposed by Gibor Basri, Professor of Astronomy at the 
University of California at Berkeley. Basri [2003] suggests that there are three different kinds of 
properties pertinent to the definition of a planet. First, there are the characteristics, which are the 
physical attributes such as mass, size, luminosity; second, there are the  circumstances, the most 
important of which are the orbital attributes; third, there is the  cosmogony, which is the way of 
formation.  The  main  characteristic  on  which  the  discussion  is  focused  is  the  maximum  and 
minimum mass of a planet. The maximum mass can be determined in two different ways: one can 
consider the mass above which core fusion is possible, or one can consider the mass above which 
electron degeneracy is possible. The former sets a limit of about 13 Jupiter masses, the latter sets a 
limit of about 2 Jupiter  masses. Thus the upper mass for a planet is between 2 and 13 Jupiter 
masses. The lower mass can be determined by the requirement that a planet has a spherical shape: it 
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is below Ceres’s mass, and corresponds to a size of about 500 km for an object with a density 
similar to the asteroids. These considerations suggest two definitions:
A fusor is an object capable of core fusion, that it is an object with a mass above 13 Jupiter 
masses.
A planemo (short for ‘planetary-mass object’) is a spherical non fusor, that it is an object 
with a mass between Ceres’s mass and 13 Jupiter masses.
With respect to the circumstances, there are two main questions, one whether an object not 
orbiting around a star  can be regarded as a  planet,  the other  about  the orbital  dominance of a 
candidate planet. The first question is important because astronomers have discovered planetary-
mass objects not orbiting around a star, but free-floating in star clusters. Basri suggests that the 
requirement that a planet must orbit around a star is essential for the definition of a planet. The 
second question is strictly involved with the status of the largest asteroids and with Pluto’s status as 
a planet. The largest asteroids where demoted from planets because too many objects were found 
near them. On the contrary, the nine recognized planets (with Pluto’s exception) have removed other 
comparable objects from their orbit. Pluto is too small to achieve this result, and it is accompanied 
by several objects with similar mass and orbit. In this respect, Pluto and Ceres are indistinguishable. 
For historical reasons, Basri is prone to retain Pluto as a planet, and thus he does not consider that 
the orbital dominance requirement is essential. 
Basri suggests that the cosmogony of planets is too uncertain to be useful in a durable and 
effective definition. Thus he puts forward the following definition:
A planet is a planemo orbiting a fusor.
According  to  this  definition,  not  only  Pluto  retains  his  status  as  a  planet,  but  also  the  largest 
asteroids regain their status as planets. Moreover, the largest TNOs discovered must be regarded as 
planets.
Mike  Brown,  a  member  of  the  group which discovered  2003UB313,  has  analyzed four 
criteria for a definition of a planet (Brown [2004]). The first criterion is a purely historical one: the 
known nine planets are the only planets in the solar system and nothing else is a planet. Brown 
discarded this definition, because it “makes the word ‘planet’ meaningless as a scientific definition” 
(Brown [2004]). The second criterion is a slight variation of the first: the nine known planets are 
planets and every object larger than Pluto is also a planet. Brown discarded this definition because 
there is no scientific reason to set the boundary at Pluto’s size. The third criterion regards as a planet 
every object “which is round due to its gravitational pull and which directly orbits the sun” (Brown 
[2004], italics in the original). Here the problem is – according to Brown – that this definition is 
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historically incorrect. In the history of astronomy there is no reference to the roundness of a body as 
a condition for its status as a planet. For example, Ceres was initially considered a planet, and later 
demoted from planet, but its shape was unknown. The fourth criterion is orbital dominance. All 
known planets, with the exception of Pluto, are solitary objects, that is “in their region of space 
there is only them […] and then a collection of much much smaller objects […] with no continuous 
population in between” (Brown [2004]).  On the contrary, Ceres, Pallas, Juno and Vesta are not 
solitary objects “because one region of space contains objects with a continuous range of sizes” 
(Brown [2004]).  Brown accepted this criterion as a definition of a planet: a planet is a solitary 
object in the solar system. According to this definition, Pluto is not a planet, for the very same 
reason according to which Ceres is not a planet: they share their orbit with similar objects. This 
definition excludes 2003UB313 – at that time yet unknown – from the list of planets.
After  the  discovery  of  2003UB313,  Brown has  changed  his  mind and has  suggested  a 
different  definition (Brown [2005]).  The most  important  point,  according to  Brown,  is  culture. 
“Pluto is a planet because culture says it is” (Brown [2005]). From this assumption, Brown easily 
shows that the only rational choice is to regard as a planet every object bigger than Pluto. Thus 
2003UB313  is  a  planet,  the  tenth  planet  of  the  solar  system.  Brown  plainly  admits  that  this 
definition is very different from the definition he proposed one year before.
The Working Group on Extrasolar Planets (WGESP) under Division III – Planetary System 
Sciences of the IAU has proposed a working definition of a planet in extrasolar systems. The need 
for such a definition has arisen out of the discoveries of planets in extrasolar systems. Due to the 
limitations in the sensibility of the observational techniques, the discovered planets typically have a 
mass greater than Jupiter, the most massive planet of the solar system. Thus a question has arisen 
about the value of the mass above which a celestial body cannot be considered a planet. Moreover, 
free-floating objects (i.e. objects not orbiting around a star) have been discovered in star clusters: 
are  they  planets?  The  definition  of  a  planet  developed  by  WGESP is  aimed  to  answer  such 
questions. WGESP has proposed a working definition of a planet, “subject to change as we learn 
more about the census of low-mass companions” (WGESP [2001]). A planet is an object with a 
mass below 13 Jupiter masses (the limiting mass for core fusion) that orbits a star. The lower mass 
for a planet should be the same as that used in our solar system (thus nothing is said about the status 
of Pluto and Ceres). Really, the lower mass is now not important in the search for extrasolar planets, 
because of the limited sensibility of empirical techniques.
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According to the draft definition proposed by the IAU Planet Definition Committee (IAU 
[2006a]) a planet is a celestial body which is round due to its gravity6, orbits a star, and is not a star 
nor a satellite. In a binary or multiple system, if the barycentre is inside the primary object, the 
secondary is called ‘satellite’; otherwise, when the barycentre resides in space (i.e. the centre of 
gravity  is  outside  the  primary  object)  the  secondary  object  is  a  planet  if  it  satisfies  the  other 
conditions. According to this definition, the known planets in the Solar system are twelve: the nine 
planets actually known (Pluto retains his status as a planet), the larger asteroid Ceres, the recently 
discovered 2003UB313, and Pluto’s larger moon Charon (the barycentre of Pluto-Charon system is 
outside Pluto, and Charon is massive enough to be round). There are also a dozen of candidate 
planets (nine TNOs and three asteroids). This definition does not said anything about the upper limit 
of the mass for a planet, and thus the definition can be applied only to those planetary systems (such 
as our Solar system) where candidate planets are not too massive.
Finally, the definition passed at the 26th IAU General Assembly held in Prague, August 2006, 
defines a planet as a celestial body that orbits the Sun, has a round shape due to its gravity7, and has 
cleared the neighbourhood around its orbit (IAU [2006c]). According to this definition, Pluto is 
demoted from planet, and the known planets in the Solar system are eight: Mercury, Venus, Earth, 
Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune. A category of celestial objects, called “dwarf planet”, 
has been defined. A dwarf planet is a celestial object that satisfies the first two conditions for planets 
(i.e. orbits the Sun and is round), but has not cleared the neighbourhood around its orbit, and is not a 
satellite. Examples of dwarf planets are Pluto, Ceres, and 2003UB313. This definition is explicitly 
aimed to our Solar system, not to extrasolar planets, and thus it does not address the problem of the 
determination of the upper limit for the mass.
I briefly recapitulate the proposed definitions.
(3.1) A planet is a round object with a mass below 13 Jupiter masses orbiting an object 
whose mass is above 13 Jupiter masses (Basri [2003])
(3.2)  A planet  is  an  object  with  an  orbital  dominance  (fourth  definition  examined  and 
accepted in Brown [2004])
(3.3) Pluto is a planet because culture says it is; every object bigger than Pluto is a planet 
(Brown [2005])
6 More precisely the proposed definition says that a planet is a celestial body that has sufficient mass so that it assumes a 
hydrostatic equilibrium shape.
7 More precisely the passed definition says that a planet is a celestial body that has sufficient mass so that it assumes a 
hydrostatic equilibrium shape.
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(3.4) A planet is an object with a mass below 13 Jupiter masses that orbits a star; the lower 
mass for a planet should be the same as that used in our solar system (the working definition 
proposed by WGESP [2001]).
(3.5) A planet is an object which is round due to its gravitational pull, orbits a star, and is 
neither a star nor a satellite (the draft definition proposed by the IAU Planet Definition Committee 
in IAU [2006a]).
(3.6) A planet is an object which is round due to its gravitational pull, orbits the Sun, and has 
cleared  the  neighbourhood  around  its  orbit  (the  definition  approved  in  the  26th IAU  General 
Assemble IAU [2006c]).
4. Different kinds of definitions
It is useful to remember some basic notions of the theory of definition, and confront them with the 
suggested definitions of a planet. Hempel [1952] recognizes and discusses the following different 
kinds of definitions: nominal definition, analytic definition, empirical definition and explication.
A nominal  definition  is  a  linguistic  convention  that  introduces  a  new  notation  (called 
definiens) for an expression (called definiendum) whose meaning is already known. The definiens 
is an expression which does not occur in the language before the definition, while the definiendum 
is an expression with a well defined meaning. The definiens is an abbreviation for the definiendum. 
The definitions of fusor and planemo are examples of nominal definition. The expression ‘fusor’, 
the  definiens,  is  introduced  as  an  abbreviation  for  “an  object  capable  of  core  fusion”,  the 
definiendum,  which  already  has  a  definite  meaning.  After  the  introduction  of  fusor,  also  the 
expression “a round non-fusor” has a well defined meaning, and ‘planemo’ is an abbreviation for 
such expression. 
An  analytic  definition  deals  with  the  meaning  of  an  already  given  expression  (called 
analysandum),  and it  provides an expression (called analysans),  which is  a  synonymous of the 
analysandum.  Both  the  analysans  and  the  analysandum occur  in  the  language,  with  a  definite 
meaning, before the definition is formulated. The analytic definition explicates the meaning of the 
analysandum, and it supplies an expression that is a synonymous of the analysandum. The question 
whether an analytic definition is true or false can be resolved with the aid of linguistic methods; it is 
not  an  empirical  question.  Is  the  required  definition  of  a  planet  an  analytic  definition?  The 
expression  ‘planet’ already occurs  in  the  language  of  astronomy with  a  definite  meaning,  and 
perhaps the only aim of a definition is to explicate this meaning. If the definition of a planet were an 
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analytic definition then its validity would be ascertained with a linguistic analysis, without the help 
of factual knowledge. The definition proposed in Brown [2005] is an analytical definition. Brown 
analyses the historical and cultural meaning of ‘planet’ and concludes that Pluto must be regarded 
as a planet.  This definition is not  granted by factual knowledge,  but  it  is a  consequence of an 
analysis of the meaning of ‘planet’ in its everyday usage.
An  empirical  definition  states  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  a  given 
phenomenon. It is not at all a definition (thus it is more commonly called an empirical analysis) but 
it is an empirical law. The definition “a fusor is an object whose mass is above 13 Jupiter masses” is 
an empirical definition. Why is the limiting mass equal to 13 Jupiter masses? Why 13, and not 8 or 
100? Because the core fusion is possible only above 13 Jupiter masses. The selected value of the 
mass is determined by an empirical law. Suppose that more accurate scientific knowledge proves 
that the core fusion is possible only above 20 Jupiter masses: thus the definition of fusor will be 
considered inadequate. An empirical definition is true or false, and its status can be determined only 
by the experience or, more precisely, by the scientific knowledge. Is the required definition of a 
planet an empirical definition? The answer is no. Many scientific elements take part in a suitable 
definition of  a  planet  but  there  are  elements  that  cannot  be determined by means of  scientific 
knowledge alone. Apparently there is no scientific criterion according to which one can determine 
whether Pluto is a planet or not; this is the very difficulty for an acceptable definition.
An explication deals with the meaning of an already given expression (called explicandum), 
and it  provides an expression (called explicans8),  which explicates,  by means of  linguistic  and 
empirical methods, the meaning of the explicandum. The explicandum is an expression that occurs 
in scientific and natural  language without  a well-defined meaning.  The explicandum is used in 
science, sometimes as a self-evident expression, but really its meaning is not definite. An example 
(Hempel  1952)  is  ‘truth’,  which was used in natural  and scientific  language without  a  definite 
meaning until Tarski’s formal explication. Is the required definition of a planet an explication? The 
answer is yes. The word ‘planet’ occurs both in natural and scientific language; its meaning is not 
well-defined,  probably  because  there  was  no  reason  for  an  explication.  Until  now,  in  every 
circumstance, it was possible to judge whether an object were a planet or not. Also the dispute about 
Ceres, Juno, Pallas and Vesta was settled without the necessity for an explicit definition of a planet. 
The discovery of 2003UB313 has now precipitated the need for an explication of the meaning of 
‘planet’.
8 The term 'explicans' corresponds to the term 'explicatum', which was preferred by Carnap [1950].
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5. Requirements for an explication
A problem of explication is, by definition, not well-defined. We cannot decide, in an exact way, 
whether a proposed explication is correct. “Strictly speaking, the question whether the solution is 
right or wrong makes no good sense because there is no clear-cut answer” (Carnap [1950], p. 4). A 
well-known  example  of  an  explication  is  the  Church-Turing  thesis,  which  states  that  every 
computable function can be computed by a Turing machine. This is an explication of the informal 
notion of ‘computable function’ by means of the well defined notion of Turing machine. Is the 
Church-Turing thesis true? The question is undefined, because the expression ‘computable function’ 
has no definite meaning; in a sense, it is the Church-Turing thesis that gives a well-defined meaning 
to the notion of  ‘computable function’. The problem of a definition of a planet is similar to the 
Church-Turing thesis. We cannot ask whether a proposed definition is the right one, because the 
term ‘planet’ has not a precise and stable meaning in scientific language. We are searching for a 
definition of ‘planet’ because of the lack of definiteness of this notion; thus, we are not in the 
condition to decide about  a proposed definition using empirical,  logical and linguistic  methods 
universally  accepted.  We can try  to  adopt  suitable  requirements  for  an explication,  in  order  to 
determine  the  more  satisfactory  definition.  Carnap  [1950]  discusses  four  requirements  for  an 
explication: similarity to the explicandum, exactness, fruitfulness, and simplicity (p. 5). The last 
three are the most important, while the first requirement is probably too strong, and it is often not in 
agreement with the actual scientific procedure. 
Exactness means that the definition must be stated in exact terms and must be applicable 
without uncertainties. Fruitfulness means that the explicans must be useful for the formulation of 
scientific laws. Simplicity means that the definition must be based on properties that are easily 
ascertainable. 
Now we can try to confront the definitions (3.1) - (3.6) of a planet using these three criteria. 
In  order  to  examine  their  simplicity  (or  complexity)  it  is  important  to  identify  the  physical 
properties that are referenced. Definition (3.1) requires the determination of shape and mass of the 
candidate planet. Definition (3.2) is based on the orbital dominance, which requires the knowledge 
of orbit and mass of neighbour objects. Definition (3.3) is based on the size of the candidate planet. 
Definition  (3.4)  is  based  on  the  mass  of  the  candidate  planet.  Definition  (3.5)  requires  the 
knowledge of shape, mass, and possibly the barycentre of a multiple system (thus we must know the 
mass of the components of the multiple systems, or their orbit). Finally, definition (3.6) is based on 
shape, mass, and orbital dominance. 
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Barycentre of a multiple system (Mass or orbit of the components).
3.6 Shape.
Mass.
Orbital dominance (i.e., orbit and mass of neighbour objects).
It is easy to order these definitions according to their simplicity. Definitions (3.3) and (3.4) are 
simpler than the other definitions.  Definition (3.5) requires at  least  the knowledge of the same 
properties than definition (3.1), and thus definition (3.1) is simpler that definition (3.5). Definitions 
(3.2) and (3.6) are the most complex, because they require the knowledge of the physical properties 
not  only  of  the  candidate  planet,  but  also  of  its  neighbour  objects.  Thus,  according  to  their 
simplicity, the definitions can be ordered in this way9 : (3.3) =s (3.4) >s (3.1) >s (3.5) >s (3.2) >s 
(3.6).
With  respect  to  the  criterion  of  exactness,  only  definition  (3.1)  is  exact.  It  explicitly 
determines the upper limit  of the mass of a planet,  and implicitly – via the requirement of the 
roundness – the lower limit. On the contrary, definitions (3.2), (3.3), (3.5), and (3.6) does not define 
the upper limit of the mass, and definition (3.4) does not define the lower limit of the mass. Thus 
the definitions can be ordered as10 (3.1) >e (3.2) =e (3.3) =e (3.4) =e (3.5) =e (3.6).
What about the fruitfulness of these definitions? The lack of scientific reasons supporting 
definition (3.3) suggests that probably it cannot be fruitful. This definition uses a constant (Pluto’s 
size)  which have  no theoretical  meaning in  astronomy.  Look at  definition (3.1):  it  also uses a 
constant, the 13 Jupiter masses, but this constant has a precise scientific meaning: it is the mass 
above which core fusion is possible. 13 Jupiter masses is not an empirical constant, but a theoretical 
one, in the sense that it can be determined by means of theoretical principles and it is connected 
9 “a =s b” means “a and b are equivalent with respect of their relative simplicity”, and “a >s b” means “a is simpler than 
b”.
10 “a =e b” means “a and b are equivalent with respect of their relative exactness”, and “a >e b” means “a is more exact 
than b”.
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with important principles of physics. On the contrary, the constant used in definition (3.2) (Pluto’s 
size) can be determined only by means of empirical methods and it is not connected with theoretical 
principles. Thus it seems to be unlike that Pluto’s size can occur in useful scientific laws. So we can 
put definition (3.3) in the last place with respect to the (presumable) fruitfulness. Definition (3.4) 
cannot solve the current debate over the status of Pluto, Ceres or 2003UB313, because it does not 
define the lower mass of a planet. However it can be applied in the study of extrasolar planets. Thus 
it seems that definition (3.4) is slightly more useful than (3.3). What about the other definitions? In 
first approximation, we can assume that they can be useful in the same way – we have no reason to 
think  otherwise.  Thus11 :  (3.1)  =f (3.2)  =f (3.5)  =f (3.6)  >f  (3.4)  >f (3.3).  We have  found the 
following relations:
(3.3) =s (3.4) >s (3.1) >s (3.5) >s (3.2) >s (3.6)
(3.1) >e (3.2) =e (3.3) =e (3.4) =e (3.5) =e (3.6)
(3.1) =f (3.2) =f (3.5) =f (3.6) >f (3.4) >f (3.3)
The six proposed definitions are ordered in different ways according to different criteria. The three 
criteria here used – simplicity, exactness, and fruitfulness – are  prima facie equivalent. At a first 
sight, it seems impossible to order these definitions from the best one to the least suitable. If we try 
to construct an absolute ordering > from the above relations, we encounter some difficulties. For 
example, from the first relation we deduce (3.3) > (3.1) > (3.5). But from the third relation (3.5) > 
(3.4) > (3.3), and we have a contradiction. In this case, however, it is possible to build an absolute 
ordering in the following way. For every pair of definitions, we count the case in which the first 
definition precedes  the second. For  example,  definition (3.1) beats  definition (3.2)  two to  zero 
(definition 3.1 precedes definition 3.2 in simplicity and exactness, and is equivalent in fruitfulness). 
We have the following results:
(3.1) > (3.2) (3.1) > (3.3) (3.1) > (3.4) (3.1) > (3.5) (3.1) > (3.6)
(3.2) < (3.5) (3.2) > (3.6) (3.3) < (3.4) (3.5) > (3.6)
Thus we have the following order12 : (3.1) > (3.5) > (3.2) > (3.4) > (3.3), (3.1) > (3.5) > (3.2) > 
(3.6); definitions (3.4) and (3.3) cannot be confronted with definition (3.6) – their relative order is 
not determined.
We can adopt a different analysis for the exactness of the definitions: we can consider a 
definition exact if the definition is applicable in our Solar system. In this case, we have a different 
11 “a =f b” means “a and b are equivalent with respect of their relative fruitfulness”, and “a >f b” means “a is more 
fruitful than b”.
12 “a ~ b” means that the order between a and b is not definite, i.e. that there are no element to determine whether a is 
better that b or whether b is better that a.
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order according to exactness (3.1) =e (3.2) =e (3.3) =e (3.5) =e (3.6) >e (3.4). The absolute ordering 
is: (3.1) > (3.5) > (3.2) > (3.6) > (3.4); definitions (3.3) cannot be ordered.
In every case, it seems that definition (3.1) is the best, followed by definitions (3.5) and 
(3.2).
6. Natural kinds
We can approach the problem of a definition of a planet from a different vantage point, turning our 
attention to natural kinds. Various conceptions of natural kinds have been proposed, but there is no 
general agreement about their nature and their role in science. Examples of the disagreement about 
natural kinds can be found easily, and some of them are briefly illustrated in the following lines. 
Chemical elements, such as water and gold, are usually considered natural kinds (Putnam [1975], 
Mellor  [1977]);  however,  Collier  [1996]  claims  that  chemical  elements  are  not  natural  kinds. 
Biological  species  are  often  regarded  as  natural  kinds  and  sometimes  are  considered  the 
paradigmatic case of natural kinds (Boyd [1991]) but, according to a strict interpretation of the 
essentialist view, species are not natural kinds (Hull [1978]). Collier [1996] claims that natural kind 
terms feature in scientific  laws,  while Machery [2005] considers this  notion too restrictive and 
proposes  to  substitute  scientific  laws  with  ceteris  paribus generalizations.  According  to  Quine 
[1969], a subset of a natural kind usually is a natural kind (in Quine’s example, green emeralds are a 
kind) while, according to Machery [2005], a subset of a natural kind usually is not a natural kind (in 
Machery’s example, the set of white dogs is not a natural kind). 
I’ll  examine the problem of the definition of  a  planet  in the light  of  the three different 
approaches  distinguished  by  Machery  [2005].  First,  the  essentialist  account  (Putnam  [1975]): 
natural kinds are determined by essential intrinsic properties; an entity belongs to a natural kind 
because it possesses some essential intrinsic properties. Second, according to Collier [1996], natural 
kinds  are  those  that  features  in  scientific  laws,  that  is  in  general  statements  supporting 
counterfactuals.  Third,  according  to  the  causal  notion  of  natural  kinds  (Boyd  [1991]),  entities 
belonging to the same natural kind tend to possess similar properties due to a causal mechanism.
First,  the  essentialist  account.  A natural  kind  is  determined  by  some  essential  intrinsic 
properties. For example, water is a natural kind because it can be defined in terms of an essential 
intrinsic properties, that is its chemical formula: water is H2O. On the contrary, Goodman’s grue 
objects  are not a natural  kind,  because there is no essential  intrinsic property that defines grue 
objects.  What  about  planet?  Is  planet  a  natural  kind?  Is  planet  definable  in  terms  of  essential 
- 13 -
intrinsic properties? Look at definition (3.3); it requires that a planet must have a size greater than 
Pluto. With this restriction, a planet cannot be a natural kind, because in the definition there is a not 
eliminable reference to a specific object. Of course, one can substitute the reference to Pluto with a 
numerical value and require that a planet must have a size larger than 2300 km (Pluto’s diameter). 
But if someone ask why this numerical value, the only possible answer contain a reference to Pluto. 
On the contrary, definitions (3.1) and (3.4) define a natural kind, in spite of the reference to Jupiter; 
in fact, this reference can be eliminated, because the numerical value of the mass is determined by a 
physical law. So the definitions really refer to a general  physical law, not to a  specific object. 
Definition (3.5) makes use of essential intrinsic properties of the candidate planets, such as shape 
and mass, and possibly the centre of gravity of a multiple system – and the centre of gravity is 
determined by the mass of the components. Thus definitions (3.1), (3.4) and (3.5) define an object 
as a planet based on essential intrinsic properties; according the essentialist account, planet is a 
natural kind. Is the orbital dominance – the properties referenced by definition (3.2) and (3.6) – an 
essential intrinsic properties? No, because the orbital dominance depends not only from the physical 
properties of the candidate planet, but mainly from the physical properties of the neighbour celestial 
objects.
Now the second account of natural kinds: natural kinds are those that appear in scientific 
laws. Well known laws concerning planets are Kepler laws. Consider the first law: The planets orbit 
the Sun in elliptical orbits with the Sun at one focus. Now there is a problem: the class of planets is 
a subset of a larger class about which the same law can be formulated. Not only planets orbit the 
Sun in elliptical orbits with the Sun at one focus, but also asteroids, satellites, and comets. The same 
is true for the second and third Kepler law. Kepler laws can be formulated of a larger class than 
planets. Thus, if we require that a natural kind “is not a subset of a larger class about which the 
same generalizations could be formulated” (Machery [2005] p. 448), we are forced to conclude that 
we cannot use Kepler law in order to identify planets as a natural kind. 
Finally, the causal notion of natural kinds, according to which entities belonging to the same 
natural kind tend to possess similar properties due to a causal mechanism. What kind of causal 
mechanism can be invocated in order to grant similar properties to the planets? Probably only their 
common origin. However, the cosmogony of planets is too uncertain to be useful in this respect. 
Thus we are forced to dismiss considerations about the causal notion of natural kinds – not because 
this account of natural kinds if flawed, but because we lack scientific valuable knowledge about 
causal mechanisms concerning planets.
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Now we  can  compare  the  proposed  definition  with  the  following  general  definition  of 
natural kind: “A class C of entities is a natural kind if and only if there is a large set of scientifically 
relevant properties such that C is the maximal class whose members tend to share these properties 
because  of  some  causal  mechanism”  (Machery  [2005],  pp.  447-448).  Are  there  scientifically 
relevant properties such that planets tend to share these properties? Yes. For example, planets are 
cold and dim (they are  not  star);  they can have an atmosphere  (planet  are  round due  to  their 
gravitational  pull,  or  have an orbital  dominance,  and thus  can be large enough to  maintain an 
atmosphere); they can have water in the surface (because they are not too hot nor too small); thus 
they can – at least in principle – sustain life. Are the properties of planets shared because of some 
causal mechanism? Probably yes,  due to their  common origin,  but the actual knowledge is not 
enough in order to give an answer. Finally, is the class of planets a subset of a larger class with the 
same scientifically relevant properties? The answer is yes. Several satellites are spherical due to 
their gravitational pull, and have enough mass to maintain an atmosphere or water. In Solar system, 
the physical properties of the largest satellites are similar to the physical properties of the Earth-like 
planets; really, there is more similarity between Earth-like planets and the largest satellites than 
between Earth-like planets and giant planets. Thus planet is not a natural kind.
7. Taxonomy and dual classification
The  question  concerning  Pluto's  and  2003UB313's  status  can  be  viewed  as  a  problem  of 
classification, that is as a problem of taxonomy. The principal role of taxonomy is to provide a 
natural classification of a determined set of objects. An appropriate taxonomic system is based on 
observational data; in other words, it is necessary that the characteristics used in order to classify 
the objects can be empirically verifiable or, at least, can be inferred, in a straightforward way, from 
other observational properties or quantities. This requirement is, of course, a question of degree: 
there are properties easily observable (e.g. the apparent magnitude of a star); there are properties 
which can only be inferred from other observational quantities (e.g. the mass of the components of a 
binary system); there are properties that, at least in the present stage of scientific knowledge, cannot 
be deduced from observational data (e.g. the formation processes of the planets). What about the 
different criteria proposed for a definition of a planet? Mass, size, luminosity, roundness, orbital 
dominance, and eccentricity, are observational data. They can be determined more or less directly 
from observations. It is particularly difficult to estimate the mass m of an extrasolar planet, because 
astronomers can only determine the quantity m sin i, where i is the inclination of the planet’s orbit 
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with respect  to  the  ecliptic;  thus  m sin  i is  the lower  limit  of  the  planet's  mass.  However,  an 
estimation of the mass is simpler for an object in the solar system. 
We can turn our attention to biology, where taxonomy is very useful and highly developed. 
Three  points  are  important  in  biology:  first,  classifications  are  subjected  to  change;  second, 
taxonomy is often based on evolutionary consideration and, when possible, classifications are based 
on the phylogenetic tree; third, at least in principle, an organism belongs to one and only one taxon, 
although several different classifications have been often proposed for the same organism13.
We  can  consider  these  three  points  with  respect  to  astronomy.  Also  in  astronomy 
classifications are subjected to change. Thus, the demotion of Pluto from planet, or the promotion of 
Ceres and 2003UB313 to the status of planet, can be viewed as natural and normal changes in a 
taxonomic  system,  suggested  by  new  scientific  evidence.  With  respect  to  the  second  point,  a 
classification based on formation processes is not useful in astronomy: due to our ignorance about 
planetary formation processes, such kind of classification cannot be based on observational data. 
The third point is very interesting, because in astronomy there are examples of objects with a dual 
classification. There are celestial bodies belonging to two different classes of objects, which were 
originally considered distinct and without common members. The best known example is Chiron 
(see  A’Hearn  [2001]).  Chiron  was  originally  classified  as  an  asteroid;  later,  when  a  cometary 
activity was discovered on Chiron, it was inserted in the catalogue of comets, without removing it 
from the catalogue of asteroids. Thus Chiron belongs to two different sets of celestial objects (it is 
an asteroid and a comet); these two sets were mutually exclusive before Chiron re-classification. 
After the case of Chiron, other objects were classified as comets and asteroids (see A’Hearn [2001]). 
Dual classification can suggest relations between two different sets of objects, which were 
previously unrelated. In the case of Chiron, dual classification as asteroid and comet suggested the 
hypothesis that near-Earth asteroids may be dormant comets. Marsden [1999] and A’Hearn [2001] 
propose a dual classification for Pluto: “As with […] Chiron […], where the choice of ‘minor 
planet’ or ‘comet’ designation depends on the context, we are proposing that Pluto would have dual 
status  as  a  ‘major’  and  a  ‘minor’  body”  (Marsden  [1999]).  An  advantage  of  Pluto’s  dual 
classification is that it will expand the sample of icy planets and the sample of TNOs that reached a 
libration with Neptune (A’Hearn [2001]). Thus dual classification can be very fruitful, in the sense 
that dual classification is useful for the formulation of scientific laws and hypothesis. With respect 
to the three requirements for an explication examined in the paragraph 5, dual classification is the 
13 Taxonomic pluralists argue that there are overlapping classifications, i.e. an organism can belong to different taxa (see 
Ereshesfki [2001]). 
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best suited for a definition of a planet. It is simple, because it does not alter the existing criteria; it is 
formulated in exact terms; and, moreover, it is the most fruitful.
These  considerations  are  very  interesting  from  a  philosophical  point  of  view.  They 
remember us that there are many different ways in order to construct a classification, and that there 
is not an absolutely correct method, but every kind of classification depends on the context. If an 
astronomer is interested in the study of comets, he can determine certain criteria according to which 
celestial bodies are classified as comets. With respect to these criteria, Chiron is a comet. If an 
astronomer is interested in asteroids, she can determine certain criteria according to which celestial 
bodies are classified as asteroids. With respect to these criteria, Chiron is an asteroid. In the same 
way, if one is interested in the physics of icy planets, then he can consider Pluto as an icy planet; if 
one is interested in the dynamics of TNOs, then she can consider Pluto as a TNO. Sharp distinctions 
are not always possible, and not always they are desirable.
8. Conclusion.
I think that I have showed that some philosophical tools could be of some utility in the debate 
concerning the definition of a planet. The principal intent of this article was not to suggest a new 
definition of a planet but to analyze several proposed definitions using a couple of philosophical 
instrument – the analysis of definition and explication, and the current debate over natural kinds – 
in order to understand their philosophical implications. The principal philosophical results is that 
planet, as defined by the new official definition, is not a natural kind.
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